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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DELBERT F. ASTIN,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

No. 950253-CA

vs.

:

District Ct. No. 934402059

MARGIE M. ASTIN,

:

Category 15

Defendant/Appellant.
COMES

NOW

the

:

Appellant

to

the

above-captioned

matter

(hereinafter "Wife"), by and through counsel, and hereby submits
the following as her brief of Appellant herein:
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2) (h) , and the provisions of Rules
3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a final Decree of Divorce and the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law in support thereof of the Fourth
Judicial District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah. In
particular, Wife appeals those provisions which awarded the Wife
$600.00 per month alimony; failing to order Husband to sell the
marital residence or pay out Wife's equity therein; the provisions
wherein which the trial court denied the Wife's request that
Husband pay one-half of uncovered medical expenses and insurance
premiums

upon

the

expiration

of

her

health

insurance

COBRA

coverage; the provision wherein which the trial court ordered the
Husband to reimburse only one-half of the loans that Husband had
taken out against the Wife's whole-life insurance policy and the
award to Wife of attorney's fees in the sum of $1,000.00, rather
than more or all of those fees.
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES, AND RULES. ETC.
There is no case law authority, nor statutory authority
believed by Wife to be wholly dispositive or wholly determinative
of the issues raised on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review on appeal in this case is an abuse of
discretion standard. "Trial courts have considerable discretion to
adjust

divorcing

parties'

financial

and

property

interests."

Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 122 (Utah App. 1988),
citing Ruhsam v. Ruhsam, 742 P.2d 123, 124 (Utah App. 1987).

This

court has stated that "[a]bsent a showing of clear and prejudicial
abuse of discretion, we will not interfere with an alimony or
property award." Throckmorton, at 123, citing Gardner v. Gardner,
748 P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988); Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397
(Utah App. 1987) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This divorce action was tried before the Fourth Judicial
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, on the 2nd
and 6th days of September, 1994, the Honorable Boyd L. Park,
presiding. The judge, among other things, entered orders regarding
2

alimony, property distribution, insurance coverage, and attorney's
fees.
The Decree of Divorce and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law from which the Wife appeals, were signed and entered by the
court on February 23, 1995. Said Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Decree of Divorce are attached hereto, designated as
Appendix "A" and "B", respectively.

The trial court's written

memorandum decision, dated October 7, 1994, is attached hereto and
designated as Appendix "C."
Wife filed a Notice of Appeal on March 23, 1995. Wife appeals
the trial court's alimony award, disposition of the parties'
marital home, failure to award contribution to Wife's future health
related expenses, failure to order Husband to restore Wife's life
insurance policy, and award of attorney's fees.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married on April 12, 1962 in Salt Lake City,
Utah.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. %2, Index 111).

The parties resided together continuously as Husband and Wife until
the date of their separation, September, 1993.
and Conclusions of Law, ^[3, Index 111) .

(Findings of Fact

The parties had five

children together, only one of which was a minor at the time of
trial.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. f5, Index 111).

The parties were married for thirty-three years.
Wife was born September 3, 1941 and was fifty-two years of age
at the date of trial.

(Tr., pg. 66, lines 16-19, Index 193) . Wife
3

was twenty years of age when the parties were married.

(Tr,. pg.

74, lines 9-12, Index 201).
Wife had, historically, been a homemaker and Husband the
financial support of the family.

(Tr., pg. 73, lines 13 - 25, pg.

74, lines 1 - 8 , Index 200 - 201). At the time of trial, Wife was
unemployed.

(Tr., pg. 68, lines 3 - 9 , Index 195).

Wife has been

diagnosed as having depression and multiple personality disorder.
(T£-/ P9-

55

> lines 4 - 1 2 , Index 182) . Wife was receiving $429.00

per month in social security disability benefits at the time of
trial.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1)7, Index 110).

Husband was employed by Prudential Insurance Company of America as
an insurance agent and acted as an independent broker for other
companies.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^[9, Index

110) .
Pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, the Husband was
awarded the custody of the remaining minor child and was awarded
the child's social security benefit in the sum of $189.00 per
month, which was received as a result of the Wife's disability and
in lieu of any contribution by Wife to Husband for child support.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^[5, 1(10, Index 111, 108) .
At the time of trial, Wife testified regarding her health and
her physician, Dr. David Bennion, testified, that in his opinion,
Wife was currently incapable of earning a living.
lines 12 - 14, Index 190) .

(Tr., pg. 63,

The trial court found that Wife

receives $429.00 per month in social security disability benefits
4

and that she had been diagnosed as having depression and multiple
personality

disorder, both

of which are difficult

to treat.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1)8, Index 110) .

Wife

testified that she currently resided with her sister, but wanted to
become independent and move into a home or apartment.
68, lines 16 - 19, Index 195).

(Tr. , pg.

Her monthly expenses while living

with her sister and paying no monies to her sister were testified
to be $1,372.00, which would increase to, approximately, $2,758.00
upon divorcing and moving from her sister's home.
lines 2 - 9 , Index 198).

(Tr., pg. 71,

The trial court also found that the Wife

had been insured under Husband's health insurance, through his
employment, which, upon the parties' divorce, would convert to
coverage under federal COBRA legislation at which time the monthly
COBRA health insurance premium would be $300.00, thus increasing
her monthly expenses.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law %6,

Index 111, 110) . The lower court also found that although Wife was
eligible for Medicare benefits, she would become ineligible upon
receiving alimony.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ^8,

Index 110).
At the time of trial, Husband testified that he was employed
by

Prudential

salesman.

Insurance

Company

of America

as

an

(Tr., pg. 13, lines 23 - 25, Index 140).

insurance
Husband

further testified that he acted as an independent broker for Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Utah, GEM Insurance, and Jackson National Life
Insurance Company.

(Tr., pg. 22, lines 7 - 10, Index 149). His
5

income for 1993 was $44,839 00, his income for 1992 was $63,074.00,
and his income for 1991 was $49,062.00.

(Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law ^[9, Index 110, 109) . Husband testified that the
1992 income was unusual in that an additional $19,000.00 was paid
to him for sick pay earned in 1991 when he had triple bypass
surgery.

(Tr., pg. 20, lines 1 - 13, Index 147).

Further, the Husband testified that he was capable of paying
alimony of between $300.00 and $400.00 per month.
lines 1 2 - 1 5 , Index 155).

(Tr., pg. 28,

Husband testified that he had monthly

expenses, including expenses attendant to his minor child and other
children or relatives living in his home of $3,846.00, and that
those expenses included the support of a grandchild and several
adult children as well as himself and the parties' minor child.
(Tr., pg. 30, lines 1 - 25, pg. 31, lines 1 - 20, Index 157, 158).
In examining the Husband's monthly expenses, the trial court
found

that

$1,900.00.
108).

the

Husband's

reasonable

monthly

expenses

were

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1l0, Index

The trial court also found that Husband's average gross

monthly income was $3,829.36, from which job expenses were paid
resulting in a gross monthly income of $3,501.36 and net monthly
income of $2,626.64.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law %9,

Index 110, 109, 108, Memorandum Decision 1(16, Index 92 -93) . The
trial court found that the Husband, after paying his $1,900.00
expenses, had $726.64 remaining disposable income.

(Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law ^f 10# Index 108, Memorandum Decision,
6

117, Index 92).

The trial court found that a reasonable amount of

monthly alimony

to be paid by Husband

to Wife was $600.00.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 112, Index 107).
The trial court found that the remaining minor child had two
years left in high school and that to enable the child to continue
to enjoy the same security and surroundings that it was reasonable
that the Husband be awarded the exclusive use and benefit of the
parties' marital residence until the child's graduation from high
school or attaining the age of 18, whichever last occurred.
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1l3, Index 107) .

Wife

testified that given the substantial equity in the home, that it
was reasonable that the home be sold and that the parties divide
the equity.

(Tr., pg. 101, lines 12 - 16, Index 228).

Wife

testified that she had no funds of money from which to draw without
the sale of the home and that she could not get into a home of her
own without those funds.

(Tr., pg. 101, lines 17 - 23, Index

228) .
The Wife testified that the Husband, a life insurance agent,
had unilaterally taken loans against Wife's whole life insurance,
of which she was an owner, and that in order to do so, Husband had
forged her name and used the funds, during the course of the
marriage, for purposes unknown to Wife and without consultation
with Wife.

(Tr., pg. 94, lines 4 - 22, Index 221) . Wife requested

that the trial court order Husband to reimburse all monies borrowed
from that whole life policy and unencumber the same.
7

(Tr., pg.

95, lines 1 8 - 2 2 , Index 222).

The trial court awarded the policy

to Wife and ordered the Husband to restore one-half of the value of
the

amounts

that

he

borrowed

from

that

whole

life

policy.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1(20, Index 104) . Wife was
ordered to pay future premiums.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law 120, Index 104).
At the time of trial Wife had requested that the trial court
award a decree of separate maintenance rather than a decree of
divorce because, upon the parties' divorce, her medical coverage as
a spouse would not be available at little or no cost.
71, lines 15 - 21, Index 198) .

(Tr., pg.

Upon the parties' divorce, Wife

testified that her monthly health insurance premiums, under federal
COBRA legislation, would be $300.00 per month. (Tr., pg. 71, lines
1 5 - 2 1 , Index 198).

Further, Wife testified that after a period

of three years, that COBRA coverage would no longer be available
and she would be uninsured and uninsurable.
pg. 72, lines 1 - 6 ,

Index 198, 199) .

(Tr., pg. 71, line 25,
The trial court denied

Wife's request that a decree of separate maintenance be awarded
rather than a divorce, indicating that it should not order Husband
to stay married if Husband desired the divorce.

(Finding's of Fact

and Conclusions of Law %6, Index 111, 110) . Wife testified that it
was reasonable that the court then order Husband to contribute to
her monthly health insurance premiums upon the expiration of the
COBRA coverage and participate in the payment of uncovered medical
expenses at that date.

(Tr.,

pg. 72, lines 9 - 15, Index 199).
8

However, the trial court found that the question of whether Wife
would be otherwise uninsurable upon the conclusion of her COBRA
insurance coverage was a matter of speculation and that the trial
court would not address the issue at that time.

(Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law 1|23, Index 104) . The trial court indicated
that Wife could petition the court for a modification of the Decree
based upon a material change of circumstances, if she was uninsured
at that time.

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 1)23, Index

103) .
At the time of trial, the Wife testified as to her needs and
abilities to pay attorney's fees. The Wife's counsel was permitted
to proffer fees and that proffer was not objected to.

(Tr., pg.

118, lines 1 6 - 1 9 , Index 244) . Wife's counsel proffered that fees
and costs were $3,579.00.

(Tr., pg. 118, lines 20 - 25, pg. 119,

lines 1 - 1 4 , Index 244, 245). Husband argued that neither party
was capable of paying the other party's attorney's fees and that
each should pay their own.

(Tr., pg. 29, lines 18 - 22, Index

156) . The trial court found that neither Husband nor Wife had the
ability to pay significant fees.
90) .

(Memorandum Decision i|21, Index

The trial court further found that though unopposed, that

Wife had not submitted an affidavit regarding her attorney's hourly
rates or itemization.

(Memorandum Decision 121, Index 91). The

trial court awarded judgment to Wife for her attorney's fees in the
sum of $1,000.00.

(Decree of Divorce ^[16, Index 100).

9

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The parties to this action were married for thirty-three
years.

Throughout that period Wife was a homemaker, raised five

children, and supported Husband in his career pursuits.

However,

at the time of the parties' divorce, Wife was disabled, unable to
obtain future employment, and financially destitute. Wife had the
need for alimony in an amount greater than $600.00 per month, and
Husband had the ability to pay the larger amount.

Further, the

trial court failed to equalize the parties' standards of living and
did not attempt to maintain Wife in the standard of living that she
enjoyed during the parties' marriage.
Additionally, the trial court erred in refusing to order the
immediate sale of the marital home or in ordering the Husband to
refinance the home an pay out the Wife's equity.

Wife had an

immediate need for her one-half share of the equity in the home in
order to meet her expenses and acquire a new residence.

No cash

assets existed in the marital estate. The parties' minor child was
sixteen at the time of trial.

There was no evidence that the

Husband was financially unable to refinance the property and pay to
Wife one-half of the equity.
Further, because of the entry of the decree of divorce, Wife
was no longer able to remain insured through Husband's employer.
Wife was

required

to

obtain

health

insurance

through

COBRA

legislation at approximately $300.00 per month and will further
become uninsurable when the COBRA coverage expires. Husband should
10

have been required to pay one-half of Wife's health insurance
premiums incurred as a result of the parties' divorce as well as
one-half of Wife's medical expenses incurred after the expiration
of her COBRA coverage.

Husband had originally stipulated that a

Decree of Separate Maintenance could be granted (Tr., pg. 4, lines
21 - 25, pg. 5, lines 1 - 8 , Index 131 -132) . In the course of the
trial, however, the Husband withdrew the stipulation (Tr., pg. 212,
lines 1 7 - 1 8 , Index 247).
Husband unilaterally

took out loans against Wife's life

insurance policy, which was Wife's sole and separate property.

In

order to obtain such loans, Husband forged Wife's signature.
Husband did not consult nor notify Wife of the loans nor the manner
in which the proceeds received from the loans were spent.

Also,

after the parties' separation Wife was financially unable to make
the premium payments on the policy and an additional loan was taken
against the policy for reimbursement of premium payments by the
insurance carrier.
insurance

policy

Thus, at the time of divorce Wife had an
worth

merely

$1,400

cash

value, which had

previously had an $8,000.00 cash value. The court erred and abused
its discretion in not ordering Husband to reimburse the policy
fully.
Finally, the trial court erred in failing to award Wife's
attorney's fees in the amount requested.

The fees requested were

reasonable based on the length and complexity of the case, were at
a level consistent with that charged by similarly trained and
11

experienced attorney's in the area, and were not objected to by
Husband's counsel.

The trial court awarded only $1,000.

This

award should be reversed and Wife should be awarded judgment
against Husband for attorney's fees in the amount requested at
trial.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING WIFE ALIMONY IN
THE AMOUNT OF $600.00, CONSIDERING WIFE'S NEEDS,
HUSBAND'S ABILITY TO PAY, EQUALIZATION OF THE PARTIES'
INCOME, AND THE PARTIES STANDARD OF LIVING DURING THE
MARRIAGE.
Although a new alimony statute has been enacted by the Utah
State Legislature, at the time of trial in this matter, the prior
law was controlling, which states that

ff

[w] hen a decree of divorce

is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating
to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties."
§30-3-5(1), Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended).
This statute allows considerable discretion to be given to the
trial court. However, certain standards have been set forth by the
Utah

appellate

courts,

especially

with

regard

to

long-term

marriages such as the marriage in the case at hand.
"Utah courts have held that "[a]n alimony award should, after
a marriage . . . and to the extent possible, equalize the parties'
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage." Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah App. 1993),
citing Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); see
12

also Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985); Roberts v.
Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 198 (Utah App. 1992); Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d
489, 491 (Utah App. 1991).
"In light of this goal, the trial court must consider:

'(1)

the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income; and
(3) the ability of the supporting spouse to provide support.'"
Godfrey, at 589, quoting Roberts, 835 P.2d at 198; see also Jones,
700 P.2d at 1075, Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 843 (Utah
App. 1992); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App.
1989) . "Failure to consider these factors in fashioning an alimony
award constitutes an abuse of discretion." Godfrey, at 589, citing
Bell, 810 P.2d at 492.
In the instant case, Wife requested alimony in the amount of
$1,400.00 per month, however the trial court awarded alimony to the
Wife in the amount of $600.00 per month.

The parties had enjoyed

a thirty-three year marriage in which they lived comfortably.
Husband

had

earned

$44,839.00;

$63,074.00;

and

$49,062.00,

respectively, during three years immediately preceding the parties'
separation.

After separation, Husband continued to live in the

marital residence and at or near the standard of living he enjoyed
during

the

considerably.

marriage;

Wife's

financial

situation

declined

Wife was required to live with her sister to meet

her monthly expenses.

Temporary alimony was ordered at $1,000.00

per month (R.Q.A., 22).
13

Wife's

financial

situation and needs dictated

a greater

alimony award than the $600.00 amount awarded by the trial court.
The trial court found Wife's monthly income to be $429.00 and
monthly expenses to be $1,372.00 at the time of trial.

However,

the court noted that the Wife was living with her sister at the
time and desired to live on her own, which would necessarily
require her to incur greater monthly expenses.

Wife testified

those expenses would increase to $2,758.00 upon finding a home of
her own (Tr., pg. 71, lines 2 - 9 , Index 198). Certainly such a
disparity between income and expenses requires a greater alimony
award.
Further, Wife

suffers

from a disability:

depression and

multiple personality disorder, which prevent her from obtaining
employment. Wife's disability, combined with the fact that she has
basically been a homemaker for thirty-three years and has no
marketable

skills,

certainly

preclude

her

from

producing

a

sufficient income to support herself.
Husband had the ability to pay an amount greater than the
$600.00 award. The trial court found Husband's monthly net income
to be $2,626.64 and monthly expenses to be $1,900.00.

These

expenses included those incurred for him and the parties' minor
child, whose custody was awarded to Husband.

The trial court

further awarded Husband the $189.00 received by the minor child
through Social Security as child support. This amount is received
by the child pursuant to the Wife's disability.
14

Accordingly,

pursuant to the trial court's findings, after adding Husband's
monthly income ($2626.64) and the child's Social Security benefit
received

($189.00), Husband has total

net monthly

income of

$2,815.64. After deducting Husband's monthly expenses ($1,900.00),
Husband has excess monthly income of $915.64.
It is important to note that the court in analyzing the
appropriate level of alimony acknowledged that Husband had $726.64
net disposable remaining after he paid expenses. The court failed
to include the additional $189.00 in social security Husband
received each month in analyzing the Husband's true net income
(Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law,

flO,

Index 108,

Memorandum Decision, fl7, Index 92) . In comparison, Wife's monthly
income, pursuant to the trial court's findings, is $429.00. Wife's
monthly expenses, even without considering

any extra expense

incurred to move from her sister's home, are $1,372.00.

Thus,

after deducting Wife's monthly expenses from her monthly income,
Wife still has a $943.00 shortfall.
The trial court awarded Wife $600.00 per month in alimony.
Even including this award, Wife has a shortfall of $343.00, while
Husband

retains

$315.64

in excess

of

his

monthly expenses.

Certainly this cannot be said to be an equalization of the parties'
income and there was no attempt to maintain wife at the standard of
living the Wife had experienced prior to the parties' divorce.
Further, the court did not award sufficient alimony to allow
the Wife to move from her sisters' home.
15

Wife testified that she

was living with her sister at the time of trial.

Wife further

testified that her sister allowed Wife to live with her without
paying rent or other expenses.

However, Wife testified that she

desired to live independently. The living arrangements with Wife's
sister were intended to be on a temporary basis.

Wife testified

that in order to live in her own apartment, Wife's monthly expenses
would increase to $2,758.00 (Tr. , pg. 71, lines 2 - 9 , Index 198).
Thus, increasing the disparity between Wife's income and earnings
to a shortfall of $1,729.00. Finally, because Wife would no longer
be able to obtain insurance coverage through Husband's employment,
Wife's monthly

expenses

increased

another

$300.00

insurance coverage under federal COBRA legislation.

for health
Hence, after

the divorce Wife had an income of $1,029.00 and expenses of
$3,058.00 per month.

Wife's shortfall was then $2,029.00.

The Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court has
consistently overruled trial court decisions which award inadequate
levels of alimony in long-term marriages. In Martinez v. Martinez,
818

P.2d

538

(Utah

1991),

the

Court

circumstances, it may be appropriate

held

that

fl

[i]n

some

to try to equalize the

spouses' respective standards of living." The Court held that when
a marriage is of long duration and one spouse helps the other to
increase their earning capacity, it may be appropriate to make a
"compensating adjustment" in dividing property and determining
alimony.

Id. at 542.
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In Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988), the
Court held that "the ultimate test of the propriety of an alimony
award is whether, given all of these factors, the party receiving
alimony will be able to support him or herself as nearly as
possible to the standard of living . . . enjoyed during marriage."
Id., at 1147.

The Court also held that where the marriage is of

long duration and one spouse's earning capacity greatly exceeds
that of another, it is appropriate to order alimony at a level
proportionate to that enjoyed during the marriage.

Id. at 1147.

In the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985), in
a marriage in excess of 30 years, the trial court awarded $1,000.00
per month alimony for five years and reducing thereafter.

The

Appellate Court, in analyzing the appropriate considerations,
determined that "the trial court's alimony award was inequitable,
both in terms of the initial amount and the graduated diminution
over

time.

The wife

is

in her mid-fifties, possesses

marketable job skills and has little hope of retraining."
1076.

few

id. at

"The original award must be more substantial, considering

the husband's real discretionary income, and should continue at
that level for the foreseeable future."

Id. at 1076.

In the case of Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988),
the trial court had awarded alimony at the rate of $1,200.00 per
month and the wife had appealed.

The Appellate Court agreed that

the alimony award was insufficient and inequitable.

JEd. at 1081.

The Court went on to state that given the wife's monthly expenses
17

and needs and her limited future earning potential, the alimony
award was insufficient to equalize the parties's standard of
living.

Id. at 1081.

In the case of Higley v. Hicrley, 676 P.2d 379 (Utah 1983), the
Supreme Court of Utah found that the trial court's award to the
wife of $100.00 per month permanent alimony was a clear and
prejudicial abuse of discretion.

Id.

at 382.

The Court in that

case, also indicated that it is within the purview of the Appellate
Court to make a modification of the decree and not necessarily
remand it for entry of a modified judgment by the trial court, if
adequate record exists from which to make that determination. Id.
at 382. In Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988), the
Appellate Court did amend the alimony award from $400.00 per month
to $750.00 per month without remand, given that the trial court had
clearly abused

its discretion and the amount of alimony was

inadequate to meet the wife's monthly needs. Id. at 75. Again, in
the case of Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991), the
Appellate Court found that in a thirty plus year marriage with a
wife of approximately 50 years of age, that a monthly alimony award
of $1,800.00 was inadequate and did not come close to equalizing
the parties' standard of living and that the award was clearly
erroneous.

Id. at 1213.

It is clear from the holding of the courts in the referenced
cases that the Wife's alimony in this matter should be reconsidered
and that the court should modify the award appropriately. The Wife
18

in this case is in her fifties, has no substantial work experience
and has been a homemaker since the age of 20. She devoted her time
and effort to raising the parties' five children and support
Husband in his employment.
impediment

to

her

ability

Further, there is a significant
to obtain

employment

and provide

financial support for herself due to her debilitating mental and
emotional illness.

Consequently, the Wife's financial situation

and her need for alimony, combined with her inability to provide
income for herself and the husband's ability to pay, even as
articulated in the findings of the trial court, the $600.00 per
month alimony award should be reversed and modified by this court.
II. THE MARITAL HOME SHOULD HAVE BEEN ORDERED SOLD AT
THE TIME OF DIVORCE, WITH THE EQUITY IN THE SAME DIVIDED
BETWEEN THE PARTIES IMMEDIATELY OR HUSBAND SHOULD HAVE
BEEN REQUIRED TO "BUY OUT" WIFE'S INTEREST IN THE HOME.
The financial situation of the parties in this matter were
such that an immediate sale of the marital home or payment by
Husband of Wife's equity would be equitable and would assist in
placing Wife in a position in which she would have a greater
ability to provide for herself independently.
The factors considered in fashioning an equitable property
division are as follows:
11

[T]he amount and kind of property to be divided; whether
the property was acquired before or during the marriage;
the source of the property; the health of the parties;
the parties' standard of living, respective financial
conditions, needs, and earning capacity; the duration of
the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties'
ages at time of marriage and of divorce; what the parties
gave up by the marriage; and the necessary relationship
19

the property division has with the amount of alimony and
child support to be awarded."
Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah App. 1990); citing Burke v.
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987).
In this case, the marital home was acquired during the
parties' marriage. Wife is in poor health and is suffering from a
debilitating disability, and the parties' standard of living prior
to

the

divorce

was

comfortable.

Further,

Wife's

financial

condition since the entry of the decree, as stated above, has
worsened considerably. Wife has a shortfall in meeting her monthly
expenses by an amount over $1,000.

Wife is financially unable to

live in her own apartment and must reside with her sister. On the
other

hand,

Husband's

financial

situation

has

not

changed

considerably since the entry of the divorce.
This is a thirty-three year marriage in which both parties
have expended considerable time and effort.

As discussed above,

Wife is not in a situation in which she has the ability to provide
an income for herself. The only means by which Wife may be able to
provide herself with her own residence is by immediately receiving
her one-half
residence.

equity

in the marital home to apply

to a new

The trial court in this matter not only awarded an

alimony award which was insufficient to permit Wife to meet her
monthly expenses, the court also did not allow immediate sale of
the property to allow Wife to obtain her share of the equity which
would help her meet those expenses.
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated that

lf

[t]he overriding

consideration is that the ultimate division be equitable - that
property be

fairly divided between

the parties, given their

contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the
time of the divorce."

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278

(Utah 1987).
Certainly the court's refusal to order the sale of the marital
home or to order Husband to pay to Wife her portion of the equity
in

the

home

significantly

was

not

equitable.

Both

parties

contributed

to the marriage, Husband in terms of financial

support and family support, and Wife in terms of homemaking and
raising the parties' five children.

Additionally, the parties'

circumstances at the time of the divorce require sale of the
marital home or immediate division of that asset.

Although it is

often the trial court's desire to allow the party with custody of
minor children to remain in the marital home while the children
complete

their

different.
small child.

schooling,

the

situation

in

this

matter

is

The parties' minor child was a teenager rather than a
The child was about to begin her junior year in high

school. This was not a situation in which a move from the marital
home would require the child to lose all contact with neighborhood
friends and school classmates. The parties' minor child would have
a driver's license and a car and the ability to continue to
associate with friends and attend the same school.

Further, the

parties' other children had reached their majority age and had the
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ability to reside on their own. Accordingly, the fact that Husband
has custody of the parties' minor child should not be determinative
in the decision regarding whether to immediately sell the marital
home. Further, there was no evidence that Husband did not have the
financial wherewithal to refinance the home and pay out the Wife's
share of the marital equity.
An equitable division of the property required the immediate
sale of the marital home, or an order that Husband refinance the
home and with one-half of the equity to be distributed to Wife, it
was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to fail to do so.
III. HUSBAND SHOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO PAY ONE-HALF OF
WIFE'S MEDICAL EXPENSES AND INSURANCE PREMIUMS.
Wife's disabilities require continuous medical treatment. As
a result of the parties' divorce, Wife is no longer able to obtain
health

insurance

through

Husband's

employer.

Wife

is also

ineligible for Medicare benefits as a result of receiving alimony.
Accordingly, Wife's only option is to convert the coverage she
received

through

legislation.

Husband's

However,

the

employer
cost of

under

federal

such monthly

COBRA

premium is

substantial. Under COBRA, Wife's monthly health insurance premium
is $300.00. This amounts to nearly thirty per cent of Wife's total
monthly

income

($459

social

security

and

$600

alimony).

Additionally, after Wife's COBRA coverage expires, approximately
three

years

after

the

parties'

uninsurable.
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divorce,

Wife

will

become

The parties' divorce endangers Wife's future health.
medical

problems

disorder.

include

depression

and

multiple

Wife's

personality

Such disabilities require treatment throughout the

foreseeable future. Treatment for these disabilities is expensive.
Prescription
average.

expenses

alone

for Wife

are

(See Defendant's Exhibit #10.)

$385.23 per month,
In addition to the

psychiatric illness, Wife also had coronary artery bypass surgery.
(See Tr. , pg. 56, lines 1 3 - 1 8 , Index 183.)

Testimony was also

received that the Wife had past health conditions which included
ulcer, colitis, headache, reflux esophagitis, vertigo, peptic ulcer
disease, high cholesterol and that she had previously had a
hysterectomy. (Tr., pg. 57, lines 1 6 - 1 9 , Index 184.)
Wife is financially unable to pay for COBRA insurance coverage
or her medical

expenses

after such coverage

expires.

Such

financial difficulty has been created solely as a result of this
divorce action and Wife's resulting inability to obtain health
insurance through Husband's employer. Husband is in a financially
healthier position than wife and has the ability to contribute to
such payments. Accordingly, it is fair and equitable that Husband
should

be

required

to

contribute

one-half

of

Wife's

health

insurance premiums, and when the same become unavailable, to
contribute one-half to Wife's medical expenses.

It is clear from

the record that Husband chose not to allow a decree of separate
maintenance to be awarded (Tr. pg. 121, lines 17-18, Index 247),
and has thus, caused the additional expenses in premiums and
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ultimately in uncovered medical expenses to be incurred. Certainly
the trial court should have required the Husband to contribute to
those expenses and it was error and an abuse of discretion to fail
to consider those expenses either in the sharing of the expenses or
in a greater award of alimony to cover those expenses.

The trial

court's failure will result in wife becoming a public charge, which
is contrary to outstanding case law.

(See, English v. English, 565

P.2d 409 [Utah 1977] and Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 [Utah App.
1990].)

The end result is a division of the marital estate and

monies which is inequitable to wife and contrary to Utah Code Ann.
§30-3-5 (1953, as amended).
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING HUSBAND TO
REIMBURSE ONLY ONE-HALF OF THE LOANS TAKEN AGAINST WIFE'S
LIFE INSURANCE POLICY.
During the marriage Wife obtained a life insurance policy
which had a cash value of approximately $8,000.00. However, during
the course of the marriage Husband took out various loans against
Wife's life insurance policy.

Wife was the sole owner of the

policy and was not consulted or notified about the loan.

In order

to cash the checks for the loans made against the policy, Husband
forged Wife's name (Tr., pg. 94, lines 4 - 2 5 , Index 221) . Due to
the loans taken by Husband against the policy, the policy had only
a $1,400.00 cash value at the time of the parties' divorce rather
than an $8,000.00 value (Tr. pg. 95, lines 1 - 2 3 , Index 222, See
also Defendant's Exhibits No. 16 and 17).
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Wife requested that Husband be required to reimburse the
policy to the cash value it was worth prior to his unilateral
decision to take out loans against it.

The trial court ordered

Husband to reimburse only one-half of all loans he borrowed against
the policy without Wife's permission, thus restoring only one-half
of its value (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1(20, Index
20) .
This is a case in which Wife was the sole owner of her own
life insurance policy.

Without her consent and without her

knowledge, Husband took loans against Wife's policy and forged
Wife's name to do so. Wife has no personal knowledge of the manner
in which the loaned sums were spent and was not consulted in any
way concerning disbursement of these sums.
Further, this was a long-term marriage in which Wife was not
employed. When the parties' separated Wife had no means with which
to make her monthly premium payments on the insurance policy.
Accordingly, the policy went into default and the insurance company
took a loan against the proceeds to compensate for Wife's failure
to make premium payments (Tr. , pg. 95, lines 1 -23, Index 222).
Again, the "overriding consideration" of the court should be
that the division of the marital estate be fair, given the
contributions

of

the parties

circumstances at the divorce.

during

the marriage

and

their

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1172

(Utah App. 1990). Due to Husband's unilateral and questionable act
of taking loans against the policy, Husband should have been
25

required to reimburse all loans against the policy and in order to
make Wife whole.
3L. WIFE SHOULD HAVE BEEN REIMBURSED FOR ALL ATTORNEY'S
FEES INCURRED IN THIS ACTION AND THE COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN TAILING TO AWARD WIFE HER FEES.
At trial, Wife's counsel proffered that she was an attorney
duly licensed in good standing in the State of Utah and that she
had reviewed her time and billing records for legal services
provided in connection with the divorce proceedings. She proffered
her hourly rate at $150.00 and travel time hourly rate at $75.00.
Wife's counsel testified that the total fees anticipated with
follow-up would be $3,579.00 and that those fees were necessary and
reasonably incurred given the difficulty of the case and the
special needs of the Wife (Tr., pg. 118, lines 20 - 25, Index 244,
pg. 119, lines 1 - 2 5 , Index 245, and pg. 120, lines 1 -4, Index
246) . It is equitable that Wife should have been awarded fees in
this amount and not $1,000.00 as awarded by the trial court.
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3, (1953, as amended) states that !I[t]he
district court has discretion to order either party to pay the
other party's attorney fees in a divorce action."

See also, Muir

v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 741 (Utah App. 1992), citing Mauahan v.
Maucrhan, 770 P.2d 145, 162 (Utah App. 1989).
When awarding attorney's fees, "the trial court must find (1)
the requesting party is in need of financial assistance; (2) the
requested fees are reasonable; and (3) the other spouse has the
ability to pay".

Muir, at 741, citing Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d
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836, 840 (Utah App. 1991); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 425
(Utah App. 1990); Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah App.
1989) .
In this matter, Wife is undoubtedly in need of financial
assistance. Husband is in a much better financial position to pay
Wife's attorney's fees and has the ability to do so, even if the
same must be done on a payment rather than lump-sum basis.
Additionally, the requested fees were reasonable.

In Muir,

this Court stated as follows:
"In determining the reasonableness of attorney fees, the
court may consider the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting the case, the
reasonableness of the number of hours spent on the case,
the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar
services, the amount involved in the case and the result
attained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved.ff
Muir, at 741, quoting Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 (Utah
App. 1988) (quoting Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah
1985)) .
This was a complex case involving in-depth research, discovery
and expertise.

Difficult legal issues were broached, such as the

possibility to obtain a decree of separate maintenance rather than
divorce, the effects of Wife's depression and multiple personality
disorder, and the difficulties involved when dividing the marital
estate after a thirty-three year marriage.
It is also important to note that Husband did not object to
Wife's counsel's proffer of attorney's fees and merely argued that
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each party should pay their own fees.

The trial court, however,

specifically referred to the fact that Wife had not submitted an
affidavit regarding the attorney's fees and had only proffered the
same on the record.

However, the submission of an affidavit of

attorney's fees is not a prerequisite to the ability to award
attorney's fees in a divorce action.

In a similar fact situation,

the court in Muir v.Muir, 841 P. 2d 736, 741

(Utah App. 1992)

allowed wife's attorney to proffer testimony regarding the amount
and reasonableness of attorney's fees. Husband's attorney did not
object.

The court found that wife incurred $15,000.00 in legal

fees, but ordered husband to only pay $3,000.00 of those fees. The
trial court offered no explanation for the reduction. Although the
court had made general findings regarding husband's income, it made
no findings specifically regarding husband's ability to pay wife's
attorney's fees.
proffered

The court held, in Muir, that because the

evidence

of wife's attorney

fees was adequate and

entirely undisputed, the court abused its discretion in reducing
the requested amount from a sum of more than $15,000 to only $3,000
without a finding that the reduction was warranted by one of the
established factors.
"Where

"the

evidence

supporting

the

reasonableness

of

requested attorney fees is both adequate and entirely undisputed,
. . . the court abuses its discretion in awarding less than the
amount requested unless the reduction is warranted" by one or more
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of the established factors."

Muir, at 741, quoting Martindale v.

Adams. 777 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Utah App. 1989).
Wife's attorney's fees were proffered on the record at the
time of trial and were not objected to.
above, were adequate and undisputed.

Such fees, as discussed
Each of the factors for

establishing a reasonable award of attorney's fees were met.
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding only
$1,000 in attorney's fees. Thus this court should modify the award
and award the wife her fees of $3,579.00.
VI. THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD AWARD WIFE FEES AND COST
ON APPEAL.
It is clear from the Statement of Facts, that the Wife in this
case is in need of assistance and unable to meet her obligations
without assistance from Husband.
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1953, as amended), provides for the
award of attorney's fees and costs.

Either party to a divorce

action may be ordered to pay attorney's fees, including attorney's
fees incurred on appeal. See, Maughn v. Mauahn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah
App. 1989) .

It is appropriate and ordinary that when fees in a

divorce have been awarded below to the party who then prevails on
appeal, fees should be awarded to that party on appeal. Crouse v.
Crouse. 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991).
Based upon the foregoing it is reasonable that this court,
given the record below, find Wife entitled to attorney's fees on
appeal and costs.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court erred and abused

its discretion

decision to award Wife only $600.00 per month alimony.
should modify the award.

in its

The Court

The trial court further erred and abused

its discretion in its refusal to order the immediate sale and
distribution of equity of the parties' marital home or in the
alternative that Husband buy out Wife's interest in the home. The
trial court's failure to order Husband to reimburse one-half of
Wife's health insurance premiums and medical expenses should be
reversed as an abuse of discretion.

The trial court's failure to

order Husband to repay the loans against the Wife's life insurance
policy was an abuse of discretion and should be modified by this
court. Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in its award
to Wife of attorney's fees in the sum of $1,000.00 and this court
should modify the trial court's order and award Wife her fees of
$3,579.00.

Further, Wife should be awarded her costs and fees on

appeal.
Respectfully submitted this y ^ - ^ q a y of August, 1995.
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-tiDulations and various proffers by

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The court finds that Plaintiff is an actual and bona fide resident of Utah
County, State of Utah, and has been for more than three months prior to the filing of this action.
2. The court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant intermarried on the 12th day of
April, 1962, in Salt Lake City, Utah.
3. The court finds that the parties separated in September of 1993 and that,
pursuant to a temporary order of Judge Steven Hansen of the Fourth Judicial District Court on
January 20, 1994, Plaintiff has been paying Defendant $1,000.00 per month in temporary
support.
4. The court finds that the parties have developed irreconcilable differences,
making it impossible to continue living together or to continue the marital relationship and that
Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce from the Defendant and Defendant is entitled to a
decree of divorce from the Plaintiff.
5. The court finds that five children were born as issue to the marriage but that
only one child is a minor, to-wit: Emily Astin, born July 7, 1978. The court finds that Plaintiff
should be awarded the care, custody and control of said minor child, subject to the right of the
Defendant to visit with said child at reasonable times and places.
6. The court finds that Defendant amended her Counterclaim to request a decree
of separate maintenance in order to avoid additional expenses attendant to the health insurance
premium, which would increase to $300.00, and the eventual termination of her COBRA
2

coverage and potential uninsurability. The court finds that it should not order Plaintiff to stay
married, and as Plaintiff desires that a decree of divorce be granted, that the same should be
granted and that a decree of separate maintenance should not be granted to Defendant.
7. The court finds that Defendant is currently incapable of earning a living,
although this could change if a proper treatment is found, but Defendant does appear incapable
of earning a living in the forseeable future. Defendant receives $429.00 per month in Social
Security Disability benefits.
8. The court finds that Defendant has been diagnosed as having depression and
multiple personality disorder, both of which are difficult to treat. Furthermore, Defendant had
coronary bypass surgery in 1993. Defendant is taking a variety of medications. The court
further finds that, so long as Defendant is insured, her monthly expense for prescription
copayments is $76.19; without insurance Defendant's average monthly expense for prescription
would be $385.23. The court finds that, upon the divorce being entered, Defendant will be
insured under a COBRA plan which is good for only three years, at which time Defendant may
be uninsurable. Defendant's monthly COBRA health insurance premium is $300.00. Although
Defendant is eligible for Medicare benefits, she would become ineligible upon receiving
alimony.
9. The court finds that Plaintiff is employed by Prudential Insurance Company
of America as an insurance salesman and acts as an independent broker for Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Utah, Gem Insurance, and Jackson National Life Insurance Company. His taxable
3

income for the past three years was as follows: (a) $44,839.00 in 1993; (b) $63,074.00 in 1992;
and (c) $49,062.00 in 1991. The court finds that the 1992 income was unique in that it reflects
sick pay received as a result of Plaintiff's incapacitation by reason of triple by-pass surgery
which prohibited his employer from applying $19,100.00 renewal income to his 1991 income,
resulting in Plaintiff's 1992 income being disproportionate to his actual earnings and that
$19,100.00 should be deducted. After deducting the disproportionate income, the court finds
that the average annual income from 1991 through 1993 is found to be $45,958.33 per month,
giving Plaintiff an average monthly income of $3,829.36. The court finds that Plaintiff alleges
that job expenses averaging $7,865.00 annually ($655.00 per month) should be backed out of
his gross monthly wages because it would not show up on income taxes as gross income if he
were an independent agent. Plaintiff testified of these monthly expenses, but did not break them
down as to what they covered, nor did Plaintiff's attorney address this in Plaintiff's Proposed
Findings of Fact. However, in 1991, 1992, and 1993, Plaintiff filed Form 2106 along with his
Internal Revenue tax return, alleging employee business expense. The court finds that Plaintiff
does have employee business expenses necessarily incurred in the production of Plaintiff's
monthly income, and farther finds that these expenses appear exaggerated. The court will allow
one-half of such expenses or $328.00 per month, as a reduction against Plaintiff's gross income
for determination of his net income for the purposes of determining the amount of alimony to
be awarded to Defendant. Plaintiff is not an independent agent, and does not assume the same
risks and expenses as an independent agent, and the court has therefore reduced the monthly
4

employee business expense claimed by Plaintiff. The court must take the parties as it finds
them; accordingly, the court will deduct these job expenses from Plaintiff's average monthly
income and finds Plaintiff's average gross monthly income to be $3,501.36. An average of
Plaintiff's income withholding the federal, state and social security taxes during the years 1991
through 1994 is $875.72. (See W-2 forms and Exhibits 1-3.) After deducting this amount from
Plaintiffs average gross monthly income, the court finds Plaintiffs net average monthly income
is $2,626.64.
10. The court finds that Plaintiff's voluntary support of the parties' adult children
and their grandchild should not be a factor in determining the appropriate amount of alimony
awarded to Defendant. The court finds that Plaintiff's stated monthly expenses can and should
be reduced when determining the amount of alimony to be awarded to Defendant and that, after
the appropriate reduction, that would be $1,900.00. The court finds that when this amount is
deducted from Plaintiff's net average monthly income of $2,626.00, Plaintiff would have
$726.64 remaining. In so finding, the court further finds that these calculations are not precise
and it is impossible to come up with a perfect solution or amount.
11. The court finds it inappropriate to attempt to calculate child support for the
parties' minor child based upon the Uniform Child Support Schedule because the child receives
social security in the amount of $189.00 per month as a result of Defendant's disability. Since
Defendant is not in a position to contribute any sum for child support, the court finds and
concludes that the amount coming from social security, together with Defendant's obligation to
5

support the minor child, is significantly reflected in Plaintiff's monthly expenses. For these
reasons, the court finds that an independent amount of child support should not be considered
when determining the parties' monthly expenses or the amount of alimony awarded to
Defendant.
12. The court finds that, based upon Plaintiff's net average monthly income of
$2,984.64 and Defendant's net average monthly income of $429.00 and based upon the parties
needs and responsibilities, a reasonable amount of alimony would be $600.00 per month.
13. The court finds that the minor daughter, Emily, has two years left in high
school and that, to enable Emily to continue to enjoy the same security and surroundings that
her siblings have enjoyed during their minority, it is reasonable and appropriate that Plaintiff be
awarded the exclusive use and benefit of the home until Emily graduates from high school with
her class or turns 18, whichever occurs last.
14. The court finds that during Plaintiffs exclusive use and benefit of the home,
he should make timely mortgage payments, pay the taxes, and maintain the home in its present
condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted and, upon Emily's graduation from high school
with her class or reaching the age of 18, whichever occurs last, the home should be sold at the
highest price available and, after paying the mortgage payments and the balance of the debts and
obligations existing at the time of the parties' separation, that the then net equity should be
divided equally between the parties.
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possession to the Defendant for copying and, after said copying, said items should be returned
to the Plaintiff.
b.

Defendant should return to the Plaintiff, the following:

temple

clothing; missionary memorabilia (if Defendant has); any and all pictures and family
memorabilia that Defendant has should be made available to Plaintiff for copying and, upon
copying, the Plaintiff should return the same to the Defendant.
17. The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to certain retirement benefits through
the Prudential Insurance Group and that each party is entitled to one-half of said retirement
benefits. Any qualified domestic relations order should be prepared to divide those retirement
benefits.
18. The court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to claim the minor child as an
exemption for income tax purposes.
19. The court finds that the 1989 Oldsmobile has a value of $4,425.00 and that
the 1985 Dodge Truck has a value of $2,475.00. The court finds that it is reasonable and
appropriate that the Oldsmobile should be awarded to the Plaintiff and that the Dodge Truck
should be awarded to the Defendant but that, to equalize the values, Plaintiff should pay to the
Defendant the sum of $975.00. The court further finds that the 1987 Mercury is not operable
and that it should be sold at whatever price it can be sold for and the proceeds should be divided
equally between the parties.
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20. The court finds that Plaintiff should maintain the $153,000.00 Prudential Life
Insurance policy on his life and that the beneficiaries should remain the same, with Defendant
being the beneficiary of $53,000.00 and the children being the beneficiary of $100,000.00. The
court finds that Plaintiff cannot afford further term insurance. The court further finds that
Plaintiff has made loans against the policy that of which Defendant is the owner, contract
number 70810865, without the knowledge or permission of the Defendant and Plaintiff should
restore to the policy of Defendant, one-half of the value of said loans. Defendant should be
responsible for making any and all premiums on said policy henceforth.
21. The court finds that Plaintiff has the equitable ownership of two burial plots
in the Salt Lake City cemetery, next to where the stillborn child of the parties was buried, and
Plaintiff should make one of said plots available to the Defendant.
22. The court finds that Plaintiff should pay the debt owing to Thomas W.
Sorensen and that Defendant should pay the debt owing Rod Bridge, D.D.S. and Daryl G.
Anderson, M.D.
23. Defendant argues that each party should be ordered to pay one-half of all
monthly health insurance premiums and one-half of all uncovered medical expenses incurred
after the expiration of Defendant's COBRA coverage and if she is unable to secure other health
insurance. Whether Defendant will be otherwise uninsurable upon the conclusion of her COBRA
insurance coverage is a matter of speculation and the court will not address this issue at this
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time. Should this possibility become reality, Defendant may petition the court for a modification
of the divorce decree based upon a material change of circumstances.
24. The Plaintiff previously deducted from Defendant's alimony payment, onehalf of the tax liability of the parties for 1993. Defendant has requested a judgment against
Plaintiff and the court finds that it should be denied and that the deduction from temporary
alimony was reasonable. The court further finds that Defendant has made a claim for expenses
incurred at the time of separation as a result of checks that bounced when Plaintiff closed out
the parties' joint account. The Defendant's request in that regard should be denied.
25. The court finds that Defendant's request is reasonable and appropriate to have
her maiden name restored and she shall henceforth be known as Marjorie Marchand.
26. The court finds that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant has the ability to pay
significant attorneys fees and, although Plaintiff is obligated for his own attorneys fees, the court
finds Plaintiff should contribute to Defendant's attorneys fees in the sum of $1,000.00.
The court having made in writing its findings of fact, now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce from the Defendant and Defendant
is entitled to a decree of divorce from the Plaintiff, the same to become final upon the signing
and entry in the registry of actions.
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2. Plaintiff should be awarded the care, custody and control of the minor child
of the parties, to-wit: Emily Astin, born July 7, 1978, subject to the right of the Defendant to
visit with said child at reasonable times and places.
3.

Defendant has no child support obligation to the Plaintiff, based upon

Plaintiff's entitlement to $189.00 per month Social Security because of Defendant's disability.
4. Plaintiff should pay to the Defendant as alimony, the sum of $600.00 per
month, commencing in the month of October 1994 and continuing on a monthly basis until the
further order of the court.
5. Plaintiff is entitled the exclusive use and benefit of the home of the parties
until such time as the minor child, Emily, reaches the age of 18 or graduates from high school,
whichever occurs last.
6. During Plaintiffs exclusive use and benefit of the home, he should make all
mortgage payments, pay the taxes, and maintain the home in its present condition, reasonable
wear and tear excepted and, upon Emily's graduation from high school or reaching the age of
18, whichever occurs last, the home should be sold at the highest price available and after
paying the mortgage payments and the debts and obligations existing at the time of the parties'
separation, the then net equity should be divided equally between the parties.
7.

The debts and obligations existing at the time of the parties' separation

included the following, with the following amounts:
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Creditor
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Balance

Dr. Thomas Sorensen
First Security Bank (1 st mortgage)
First Security Bank (home equity loan)
Sears
Credit Card Center (Visa)
Credit Card Center (MasterCard)
First Interstate Bank (MasterCard)
Discover (credit card)

$ 2,159.00
31,169.00
30,049.00
1,503.00
2,857.00
2,959.00
1,215.00
1,308.00

8. The personalty and properties as divided by the parties is affirmed, with the
adjustments described in the foregoing findings.
9. Each party is entitled to one-half of Plaintiffs retirement benefits through
Prudential Insurance Group.
10. The court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to claim the minor child as an
exemption for income tax purposes.
11. Plaintiff should be awarded the 1989 Oldsmobile and Defendant should be
awarded the 1985 Dodge Truck, but Plaintiff should pay to Defendant, the sum of $975.00 to
equalize the values. The 1987 Mercury should be sold at whatever price it can be sold for and
the proceeds divided equally between the parties.
12. Plaintiff should maintain the life insurance on his life and the beneficiaries
should remain the same. Defendant is entitled to the policy in which she has incidents of
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ownership and PlaintiflF should restore one-half of the value of the loans he has made against said
policy without the knowledge or permission of the Defendant.
13. Plaintiff should make available to the Defendant, one of the plots in the Salt
Lake City Cemetery, next to where the stillborn child of the parties was buried.
14. PlaintiflF should pay the debt owing Thomas W. Sorensen and Defendant
should pay the debt owing Rod Bridge, D.D.S. and Daryl G. Anderson, M.D.
15. Defendant's maiden name, Marchand, should be restored and she should
henceforth be known as Marjorie Marchand.
16. Defendant is entitled to judgment against the PlaintiflF for the use and benefit
of her attorney in the sum of $1,000.00.
DATED this

Approved as to form:

KELLIE E WILLIAMS
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this f 5»-4 day of December, 1994, I mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, postage prepaid, to
the following:
Kellie F. Williams
Attorney at Law
310 South Main, #1400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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Robert L. Moody, No. 2302
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2525 North Canyon Road
Provo, Utah 84604
Telephone: (801) 373-2721
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DECREE OF DIVORCE

DELBERT F. ASTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 934402059
Judge Boyd L. Park

MARGIE M. ASTIN,
Defendant.

The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing before the court
on the 2nd day of September, 1994, and continuing into the 6th day of September, 1994, and
Plaintiff being present with his counsel, Robert L. Moody, and Defendant being present with
her counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and the coun having heard evidence and having made its ruling
from the bench regarding vehicles, home, insurance, taxes, burial plot and doctor bills, and
having made its written memorandum decision with regard to alimony and attorneys fees after
counsel submitted proposed findings of fact and being fully advised in the premises,

NOW HEREBY ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1

1. Plaintiff is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from the Defendant and
Defendant is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from the Plaintiff, the same to become final
upon the signing and entry in the registry of actions.
2. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the care, custody and control of the minor child
of the parties, to-wit: Emily Astin, born July 7, 1978, subject to the right of the Defendant to
visit with said child at reasonable times and places.
3. Defendant is not ordered to pay child support since Plaintiff is receiving
$189.00 per month Social Security benefits due to Defendant's disability.
4. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay to the Defendant as alimony, the sum of
$600.00 per month, commencing in the month of October 1994 and continuing on a monthly
basis until the further order of the court.
5. Plaintiff is hereby awarded the exclusive use and benefit of the home of the
parties until such time as the minor child graduates from high school with her class or reaches
the age of 18, whichever occurs last. At such time, the home of the parties shall be sold at the
highest price available and, after paying the mortgage payments and the debts and obligations
existing at the time of the parties' separation, the then net equity should be divided equally
between the parties.
6. The debts and obligations existing at the time of the parties' separation include
the following, with the following amounts:
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Creditor
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Balance

Dr. Thomas Sorensen
First Security Bank (1st mortgage)
First Security Bank (home equity loan)
Sears
Credit Card Center (Visa)
Credit Card Center (MasterCard)
First Interstate Bank (MasterCard)

$ 2,159.00
31,169.00
30,049.00
1,503.00
2,857.00
2,959.00
1,215.00

7. Each of the parties is hereby awarded the personalty now in their respective
possessions, but that the following adjustments are ordered to be made:
a. Plaintiff is ordered to return to the Defendant the little table and two
chairs from the kitchen; the radio/gift; knives and holder (if Plaintiff has the same); sewing
equipment (if any that Plaintiff has); toilet cover; shower rod; Christmas things (train, flowers,
Santa holders, if Plaintiff has them); newest brown weekend case (if Plaintiff has it); desk and
such school books and supplies that Plaintiff may have associated with said desk in Chris' old
bedroom; crafts and quilts that Marge made (if Plaintiff has them); and Plaintiff should make
his every best effort to have Defendant's handgun returned from his sister and deliver the same
to Defendant; Defendant's Book of Remembrance; and make available all family pictures in his
possession to the Defendant for copying and, after said copying, Defendant is ordered to return
the same to the Plaintiff.
b. Defendant is ordered to return to the Plaintiff, the following: temple
clothing; missionary memorabilia (if Defendant has); any and all pictures and family
3

memorabilia that Defendant has is ordered to be made available to Plaintiff for copying and,
upon copying, the Plaintiff is to return the same to Defendant.
8. It is hereby ordered that each party is entitled to one-half of the retirement
benefits through the Prudential Insurance Group.
9. It is ordered that Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the minor child as an
exemption for income tax purposes.
10. It is hereby ordered that the 1989 Oldsmobile shall be the property of the
Plaintiff and the 1985 Dodge Truck shall be the property of the Defendant. Plaintiff is ordered
to pay to the Defendant the sum of $975.00 to equalize the values of the vehicles. The parties
are ordered to sell the inoperable 1987 Mercury at whatever price it can be sold for with the
proceeds to be divided equally between the parties.
11. It is ordered that Plaintiff shall maintain the life insurance on his life and that
the beneficiaries shall remain the same. It is further ordered that the life insurance policy,
contract number 70810865, in which Defendant has incidents of ownership, shall be and are
hereby awarded to the Defendant and Plaintiff is ordered to restore one-half of the value of any
and all loans that he has made against said policy without the Icnowledge or permission of the
Defendant. Defendant is ordered to be responsible for making any and all premiums on said
policy henceforth.
12. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to make available to the Defendant one of the two
burial plots in the Salt Lake City cemetery, next to where the stillborn child of the parties was
buried.

memorabilia that Defendant has is ordered to be made available to Plaintiff for copying and,
upon copying, the Plaintiff is to return the same to Defendant.
8. It is hereby ordered that each party is entitled to one-half of the retirement
benefits through the Prudential Insurance Group.
9. It is hereby ordered that Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the minor child as
an exemption for income tax purposes.
10. It is hereby ordered that the 1989 Oldsmobile shall be the property of the
Plaintiff and the 1985 Dodge Truck shall be the property of the Defendant. Plaintiff is ordered
to pay to the Defendant the sum of $975.00 to equalize the values of the vehicles. The parties
are ordered to sell th e inoperable 1987 Mercury at whatever price it can be sold for with the
proceeds to be divided equally between the parties.
11. It is ordered that Plaintiff shall maintain the life insurance on his life and that
the beneficiaries shall remain the same. It is further ordered that the life insurance policy,
contract number 70810865, in which Defendant has incidents of ownership, shall be and are
hereby awarded to the Defendant and Plaintiff is ordered to restore one-half of the value of any
and all loans that he has made against said policy without the knowledge or permission of the
Defendant. Defendant is ordered to be responsible for making any and all premiums on said
policy henceforth.
12. Plaintiff is hereby ordered to make available to the Defendant one of the two
burial plots in the Salt Lake City cemetery, next to where the stillborn child of the parties was
buried.

13. Plaintiff is ordered to pay the debt owing to Thomas W. Sorensen and
Defendant is ordered to pay the debt owing Rod Bridge, D.D.S. and Daryl G. Anderson, M.D.
14. Plaintiffs maiden name is hereby restored and she shall henceforth be known
as Marjorie Marchand.
15. Defendant is hereby awarded judgment against the Plaintiff in the sum of
$1,000.00 towards Defendant's attorneys fees

Approved as to form
Kellie F. Williams
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 21

day ofT^ecemSet, 1994, I mailed a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Decree of Divorce, postage prepaid, to the following:
Kellie R Williams
Attorney at Law
310 South Main, #1400
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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m THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

DELBERT F. ASTIN,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 934402059
DATE October 7, 1994

vs.

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

MARGIE M. ASTIN,
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court for trial on September 2 and 4, 1994. The
plaintiff was present with counsel Robert Moody. Defendant was present with counsel Kellie
Williams. The parties and witness Dr. David Bennion were sworn and testified. The Court
received Exhibits 1 through 8. Exhibit 9, defendant's financial statement, was not admitted
but was made part of the file. Exhibit 10 was received, as were Exhibits 12 through 14 and
16 through 19. The Court granted the parties a divorce from one another on the grounds of
irreconcilable differences, to become final upon the signing and entry of the decree. The
Court made its ruling from the bench regarding the vehicles, home, insurance, taxes, burial
plot, and doctor bills. The Court ruled that defendant may have restored to her the name she
has requested of Maijorie Marchant. The Court took under advisement the matters of
alimony and attorney's fees. The Court ordered Counsel to submit proposed findings of fact.
These documents were received from counsel for both parties on September 21, 1994.
The Court, having heard testimony and oral arguments and having reviewed the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and being fully informed in the premises
and having reviewed the applicable law, now makes the following findings and conclusions:
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1.

This Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. The parties were married on April

12, 1962, in Salt Lake City, Utah. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah, and
has been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action.
2.

These findings and conclusions are limited to alimony and attorney's fees. All

other findings and conclusions were given from the bench.
3.

Pursuant to a temporary order by Judge Steven Hansen of the Fourth Judicial

District Court on January 20, 1994, plaintiff has been paying defendant $1,000.00 per month
in temporary support.
4.

Defendant currently resides with her sister, but wants to become independent and

move into a home or apartment of her own despite her fear, expressed at trial, of living
alone. Should she do so, her monthly expenses, given at trial as $1,372.00, would increase.
5.

Defendant receives $429.00 per month in social security disability benefits. She

has been diagnosed as having depression and multiple personality disorder, both of which are
difficult to treat. Furthermore, defendant had a coronary bypass surgery in 1993. Defendant
is taking a variety of medications. So long as defendant is insured, her average monthly
expense for prescription co-payments is $76.19; without insurance, defendant's average
monthly expense for prescriptions would be $385.23. See Exhibit 10. Defendant is
currently insured under a COBRA plan, which is good for only three years, at which time
defendant may be uninsurable. Defendant's monthly COBRA health insurance premium is
$300.00. Although defendant is eligible for Medicare benefits, she would become ineligible
upon receiving alimony.
6.

Dr. David Bennion testified at trial that in his opinion defendant is currently

incapable of earning a living, although this could change if a proper treatment is found.
7.

Plaintiff is employed by Prudential Insurance Company of America as an insurance

salesman and acts as an independent broker for Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Utah, Gem
Insurance, and Jackson National Life Insurance Company. His taxable income for the past
Memorandum Decision 934402059
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three years was as follows: (a) $44,839.00 in 1993; (b) $63,074.00 in 1992; and (c)
$49,062.00 in 1991. See Exhibits 1-3, 6. In 1991 plaintiff suffered a heart attack and had a
triple bypass surgery. Plaintiffs current health status is fair, but he testified at trial that he
now lacks the drive and energy to pursue insurance sales as actively as in the past.
Consequently, plaintiff argues that any award of alimony should be based upon his current
reduced earning capacity.
8.

Plaintiff argues that his 1991 income tax return included the sick pay resulting from

his triple bypass surgery but that his insurance earnings were withheld and carried over into
1992, resulting in an additional $19,100.00 in 1992. Plaintiff further argues that this amount
should be deducted from his 1992 earnings, leaving only $43,974.00 taxable income for
1992. When this is averaged with plaintiffs taxable income from 1991 and 1993, the result
is approximately $46,000.00, or $3,000.00 per month. Plaintiff asserts that his net average
monthly income, after taxes, is $2,313.00. See plaintiffs Proposed Findings Of Fact at 3, K
3. Plaintiff further argues that this amount should be reduced by job expenses of $655.00
per month and child support of $376.00. Id. at 2-3. This would leave a net monthly
income of only $1,282.00.
9.

The parties' minor child, Emily, is entitled to approximately $189.00 per month

from social security disability benefits, due to defendant's disabilities. Because Emily resides
with plaintiff, this amount is paid to plaintiff. In addition, one grandchild and two of the
parties' adult children reside with plaintiff. Plaintiff receives no contributions to household
expenses from the adult children residing with him, and only one of those children is
currently employed. The total of monthly expenses plaintiff enumerated in his Proposed
Findings Of Fact at 4, f 6, is $1,900.00.
10.

While testifying at trial plaintiff suggested that, given his present monthly income

and expenditures, he felt he would be capable of paying defendant an amount of alimony
between $300.00 and $400.00 per month.
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11.

Defendant argues that any award of alimony should be based upon the average

monthly gross amount earned by plaintiff over the past three years. See defendant's
Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law at 4, f 3. Should the Court agree, the
amount of alimony determined in this maimer would be $1,215.00 per month. Id. at 6, S 7.
12.

Defendant also seeks attorney fees and costs in the amount of $3,579.00. This is

based upon a calculation of 19.25 hours at a rate of $150.00 per hour, and $300.00 total
driving time.
13.

In determining whether alimony should be awarded and what amount of alimony is

appropriate, the Court must "consider each of the following three factors: (1) the financial
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to
produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to
provide support." Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah App. 1989). Defendant's
financial condition and needs justify an award of alimony, as defendant has considerable
medical expenses and her only income consists of her monthly social security disability
payment of $429.00. Defendant appears to be incapable of earning her own living in the
foreseeable future, whereas plaintiff is earning sufficient income to allow him to support
himself, the parties' minor child, and several adult children.
14.

Under Utah law, a child age 18 or older is a legal adult. U.C.A. § 15-2-1. A

parent's statutory duty to support a child, see U.C.A. §§ 78-45-3 and 78-45-4, ceases when
the child turns 18, unless that child "is incapacitated from earning a living and is without
sufficient means." U.C.A. § 78-54-2(4). Plaintiffs desire to support and assist his adult
children is to be encouraged, see Harding v. Harding. 488 P.2d 308 (Utah 1971); however,
plaintiff is not legally required to support his adult children currently residing with him.
A situation similar to the case now before the Court existed in Englert v. Englert,
576 P.2d 1274 (Utah 1978), a divorce case in which the defendant father had been providing
monthly payments to his 25-year-old son. There the Utah Supreme Court held that, because
Memorandum Decision 934402059
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there was no evidence that the son was disabled or limited in his ability to support himself,
any contribution made by the father to the son was voluntary and did not justify any
reduction in the amount of alimony he was ordered to pay to his former wife. Id. at 1275.
The court further held that the defendant had no legal obligation to maintain life insurance on
himself with his adult son as a beneficiary, and that such an obligation existed only as to the
parties' minor daughter, and only until she reached the age of 18 years. Id. at 1276.
Furthermore, in Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 (Utah App. 1993), the court held that, when
making an award of alimony, including expenses related to grandchildren would be
tantamount to giving a child support award for the grandchildren, and a grandparent has no
statutory or common law duty to provide support for his grandchildren. Id. at 546.
Accordingly, the court there held that expenses related to the parties' grandchildren were not
relevant to, nor to be considered in, the award of alimony or child support. Id. Any award
of alimony, particularly after a marriage of long duration and to the extent possible, is
intended to equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. See Gardner v.
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988). The purpose of alimony is to provide support for the
wife, not to reward her or to inflict a penalty upon the husband. See English v. English, 565
P.2d 409 (Utah 1977).
Based upon these cases, the Court finds that plaintiffs voluntary support of the
parties' adult children and their grandchild should not be a factor in determining the
appropriate amount of alimony awarded to defendant.
15.

This was a marriage of 32 years. Defendant has devoted a large portion of her life

to the marriage, and an award of alimony is appropriate. The Court finds it appropriate to
base the amount of alimony on plaintiffs recent historical earnings, since such income
reflects both the plaintiffs earning ability and the limitations thereon resulting from his 1991
heart attack and bypass surgery.
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16.

Plaintiffs alleges that his 1992 earnings should be reduced by $19,100.00, the

amount of his insurance earnings for 1991 that plaintiff claims were withheld and carried
over into 1992. The Court agrees with plaintiffs argument that the $19,100.00 should be
deducted from his earnings completely as being unusual income. Plaintiffs 1992 income
reflects sick pay received as a result of plaintiffs incapacitation by reason of triple bypass
surgery, which prohibited his employer from applying the $19,100.00 renewal income to
plaintiffs 1991 income. As a result, plaintiffs 1992 income is disproportionate to his actual
earnings. When the $19,100.00 is deducted from plaintiffs 1992 earnings, his average
annual income from 1991 through 1993 is found to be $45,958.33, giving plaintiff an
average monthly income of $3,829.36.
Plaintiff alleges that job expenses averaging $7,865.00 annually ($655.00 per
month) should be backed out of his gross monthly wages because it would not show up on
income taxes as gross income if he were an independent agent. Plaintiff testified of these
monthly expenses, but did not break them down as to what they covered, nor did plaintiffs
attorney address this in plaintiffs Proposed Findings Of Fact. However, in 1991, 1992, and
1993, plaintiff filed Form 2106 along with his internal revenue tax return, alleging employee
business expenses. This Court finds that plaintiff does have employee business expenses
necessarily incurred in the production of plaintiffs monthly income, and further finds that
these expenses appear exaggerated. The Court will allow one-half of such expenses, or
$328.00 per month, as a reduction against plaintiffs gross income for determination of his
net income for the purpose of determining the amount of alimony to be awarded to
defendant. Plaintiff is not an independent agent, and does not assume the same risks and
expenses as an independent agent, and the Court has therefore reduced the monthly employee
business expense claimed by plaintiff. The Court must take the parties as it finds them;
accordingly, the Court will deduct these job expenses from plaintiffs average monthly
income and finds plaintiffs average gross monthly income to be $3,501.36. An average of
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plaintiffs income withholding for federal, state, and social security taxes during the years
1991 through 1993 is $874.72. See W-2 forms in Exhibits 1-3. After deducting this amount
from plaintiffs average gross monthly income, the Court finds plaintiffs net average
monthly income to be $2,626.64.
17.

Plaintiff has testified his monthly expenses are $3,846.00, although these expenses

were not itemized. The Court notes that plaintiff is currently supporting one grandchild and
several adult children in addition to supporting himself and the parties' minor child.
Plaintiffs monthly expenses would be less if he were only providing for himself and the
parties' minor child. Because plaintiff is legally obligated to support only minor children
from the marriage, the Court finds that plaintiffs stated monthly expenses can and should be
reduced when determining the amount of alimony to be awarded to defendant. In examining
plaintiffs monthly obligations as identified in his Proposed Findings Of Fact at 4, f 6, they
appear to total only $1,900.00. When this amount is deducted from plaintiffs net average
monthly income of $2,626.64, infra ^ 16, plaintiff is found to have $726.64 remaining. The
Court and all parties understand these dollar calculations are never precise, and it is
impossible to come up with a perfect solution.
18.

The Court has not attempted to calculate child support for the parties' minor child

based on the Uniform Child Support Schedule because the child receives social security in
the amount of $189.00 per month as a result of defendant's disability. Since defendant is not
in a position to contribute any sum for child support, the Court finds and concludes that the
amount coming from social security, together with defendant's obligation to support the
minor child, is significantly reflected in plaintiffs monthly expenses. For these reasons, an
independent amount of child support has not been considered when determining the parties'
monthly expenses or the amount of alimony awarded to defendant.
19.

In considering defendant's future needs, the Court is more concerned that

defendant have sufficient income to provide for her medical needs and is less concerned with
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defendant's desire to be financially able to establish herself in her own home. The medical
problems and expenses associated with aging alone often restrict the activities people would
like to do, and defendant's mental disabilities would understandably place additional practical
and financial restrictions on her, whether the parties were married or divorced. Based upon
plaintiffs net average monthly income of $2,984.64 and defendant's net average monthly
income of $429.00, and based upon the parties' needs and responsibilities, the Court now
finds that a reasonable amount of alimony would be $600.00 per month. Accordingly,
plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay $600.00 per month to defendant as alimony.
20.

In her Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law, defendant argues that

each party should be ordered to pay one-half of all monthly health insurance premiums and
one-half of all uncovered medical expenses incurred after the expiration of defendant's
COBRA insurance coverage, if she is unable to secure other health insurance. Whether
defendant will be otherwise uninsurable upon the conclusion of her COBRA insurance
coverage is a matter of speculation, and the Court will not address this issue at this time.
Should this possibility become reality, defendant may petition the Court for a modification of
the divorce decree based upon a material change of circumstances.
21.

As to defendant's claim for attorney fees and court costs in the amount of

$3,579.00, the Court notes that defendant has not submitted an affidavit regarding her
attorney's hourly rates, the total number of hours expended on this case, or the itemization of
how much attorney time was expended on the various matters related to this case. In fact,
defendant has had several attorneys representing her throughout the course of this divorce,
and the Court has no evidence before it as to whether the amount of attorney fees sought is
the amount incurred solely by defendant's current attorney or the total amount incurred by all
the attorneys who have represented defendant at various stages of the proceedings.
An award of attorney fees in divorce actions rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court. See Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 844 (Utah App. 1992). Any such

award must be based on the "reasonableness of the requested fees, as well as the financial
need of the receiving spouse, and the ability of the other spouse to pay." Id. (citing Rasband
v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1337 (Utah App. 1988)). See, e.g.. Morgan v. Morgan. 854
P.2d 559, 570 (Utah Appl), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 942 (Utah 1993); Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d
489, 493 (Utah App. 1991); and Crouse v. Crouse. 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah App. 1991). It
is readily determined that neither plaintiff nor defendant has the ability to pay significant
attorney fees. Although the plaintiff is obligated for his own attorney fees, the Court finds
plaintiff should contribute to defendant's attorney fees in the sum of $1,000.00. Plaintiff is
hereby ordered to pay $1,000.00 to defendant for attorney fees.
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, findings of
fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce consistent with the terms of this decision and
submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for
signature.
Dated at Provo, Utah this 7th day of October, 1994.
BY^fffii) C O U R T S

BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE

cc:

Robert L. Moody
Kellie F. Williams
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